I believe King Abdulaziz and President Roosevelt would be very pleased with the results of their meeting fifty years ago. And I am confident that the foundations they laid will continue to ensure a vibrant U.S.-Saudi partnership for many decades to come.
-President Clinton 2/8/95
Within a year after President Clinton spoke these words, 24 Americans were killed by terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia. The Department of Defense then hastily evacuated all military family members from the country. Many analysts considered these attacks on Americans to be a direct attack on the Saudi Monarchy and its long-standing relationship with the United States. These attacks also raised opposition to the Monarchy to a more threatening level.
Today some wonder just how much longer a vibrant U.S.-Saudi partnership can continue.
The cornerstone of this foundation, the Saudi Royal Family, is facing the most severe threats to its existence since its establishment in 1926. Growing friction between rampant modernization and retention of Islamic values is creating considerable anti-Saud opposition, opposition that is becoming increasingly vocal and potentially violent. Over the past 60 years oil revenues have transformed Saudi Arabia from one of the poorest countries in the world to one with one of the world's highest standards of living. Because of Saudi Arabia's nearly total dependence on oil revenues and its limited domestic industry, it has become a general welfare state. Fluctuating oil prices since the mid 80's and excessive Gulf War debts now constrain the regime's ability to continue supporting this welfare state.
A rapidly expanding population, high unemployment, the presence of almost four million foreign workers, and the general perception of Royal Family corruption all contribute to mounting tensions. For years, the principal threat to the royal family was considered external:
Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and other bordering countries. Today many Saudi watchers consider the major threat to the regime to be internal. Indeed, internal pressures are the most significant and dangerous threat. These pressures have united the Saudi people under an Islamic banner and have increased their demands for substantial change in the way they are governed. Many believe the situation is getting out of the Royal Family's control.'
This study examines the internal pressures threatening the regime, the gravity of those pressures, and the actions the Monarchy can take to reduce growing opposition to its rule. U.S. policy in the Gulf depends in considerable part on its relationship with the Saudi Royal Family.
Thus this paper in effect examines the viability of U.S. policy for the region.
BACKGROUND THE AL SAUD RISE TO POWER
To comprehend the complexity of the problems facing the Monarchy today, we must appreciate the rapid evolution and development of the country since the turn of the century. In 1900 the Arabian Peninsula looked as it had for thousands of years, a vast impoverished region consisting of independent nomadic tribes with no central contr01.~ There was no government, no ruling family or for that matter not even a country with the name Saudi Arabia. With their apparently limited natural resources, there was no reason to believe that the prevailing harsh conditions would ever change. Abdulaziz recognized the significance of uniting the tribes under the Wahhabi banner of Islam as a means of weakening tribal loyalties. He gave the tribes little choice other than supporting the Wahhabi-backed Al-Saud. The Wahhabis used the Ikhwan warriors to prosecute a holy war on both non-believers and Muslims who questioned Wahhabi authority. They often used violent and oppressive tactics to consolidate and control the tribes under the rule of Abdulaziz and the religious imperatives of Wahhabism. Despite the often-harsh methods used to unite the tribes, Abdulaziz attempted to reestablish relationships with the tribes through efforts at diplomacy and through strategically arranged marriage^.^ Despite these efforts, some detractors claim that the House of Saud never enjoyed real affection from the Arabians; they contend that Abdulaziz and his sons grabbed off the land and the eventual oil wealth for their own benefit.5 This murky history then raises the question of just how much popular support and loyalty the Royal Monarchy enjoys today amidst growing opposition.
DISCOVERY OF OIL AND THE BUILDING OF A NATION.
Visitors to Saudi Arabia today find it hard to imagine that 60 years ago this was one of the' poorest countries on earth. Even the discovery of oil in 1938 did little immediately to improve conditions. Oil production did not start in earnest until after WWII. The primary source of revenues came from the pilgrimage tax; even this was dramatically reduced during the great Significantly as the wealth of the country increased there was a corresponding increase in the quality and quantity of services provided to the Saudi people. This largesse was based on the economic philosophy of the Saudi Royal Family, which has not changed since the days of 
CHALLENGES TO THE MONARCHY

THE ECONOMY
During the oil boom years of the 80's' Saudi Arabia was one of the world's richest countries. Today the World Bank rates Saudi Arabia as a middle income country whose per capita income has dropped by 50% since the 80's; its international reserves have fallen to $8.9
billion in 1996 from a high of $170 billion. Several factors have contributed to the crisis in the Saudi economy: the fall in oil prices, extravagant spending on building infrastructure, massive arms purchases, and the $60 billion cost of the Gulf war.14 Does this declining and unpredictable economy truly threaten the existence of a Monarchy which has been in firm control of the country for over 70 years and which transformed it fiom abject poverty to a land of wealth? This seems like an improbable scenario in most countries, but maybe not in Saudi Arabia. Here the government has been the dominant player in the country's economy, so the society is disproportionately dependent on the government for support. Government dominance of the economy has transformed Saudi Arabia into a rentier state, one wherein the government relies primarily on revenues fiom direct transfers fiom the international economy. In Saudi Arabia these revenues come fiom oil exports. The Saudi economy receives 90% of its revenues fiom the international economy.'' In short, the Saudi economy is almost wholly dependent on the global oil market.
In rentier states the public sector dominates the private sector. This dominance creates great economic dependence on the government. The government's willingness to provide serves to reduce initiative and industriousness in the private sector. In contrast to the West, where the government collects taxes to provide for the welfare of the people, the main task of the Saudi government is to distribute state revenues in the form of goods and services and subsidies to the people in the most equitable ways. 16 In prosperous times, the equitable distribution of wealth is difficult at best. As economic conditions worsened starting in the mid-807s, dissatisfaction increased as the government started to reduce its lavish welfare state even before the most recent financial crisis. This reduction did not affect everyone equally. Decline in the average Saudi's standard of living remained in sharp contrast to the continued opulent lifestyle of the Royal Family, sparking political unrest and di~enchantment.'~ Adding to this dissatisfaction are allegations of corruption and mismanagement of finances at the highest levels of government.''
When oil revenues came in well below those predicted in 1994, the government announced a 20% across the board cut in government spending. In an effort to reduce spending and the huge bureaucracy created during the boom years, the government stopped guaranteeing jobs to college graduates. Today unemployment among college graduates exceeds 25%.
Between 1990-1995 there was a deficit of over 200,000 jobs in the private sector for native Saudis.19 Additionally, the Monarchy's support of Islamic education as a means of bolstering their religious credentials has done little more than produce college graduates ill-trained for any private sector employment. The government is no longer able to absorb these graduates, thereby adding them to the ranks of the dissatisfied.*'
The problem of providing meaningful employment is a serious one. Any resolution of employment problems is inextricably linked to a reduction of foreign labor, which is estimated at around four million. 5 , problem with this program called "Saudiazation" is that many employers are critical of the , f
Saudi work ethic. During the difficult period of poverty, the Saudis worked hard just to survive.
However, today there is no sense among native Saudis that work is morally uplifting or spiritually rewarding. Critics allege that the Saudis have no work ethic. This is not surprising for a generation that has had everything provided for them, including employment. However, unless the country develops a stronger work ethic, it will always be dependent on foreign labor, which will continue to exacerbate employment opportunities and the transition to a more selfreliant state.24
Saudi Arabia has one of the world's highest population growth rates currently 3.77
annually. The exact population has always been somewhat of a mystery, since the government routinely inflated the estimates. Current figures show a population of 17,120,000, of whom 70% are native Saudis, the remainder foreign workers.25 Since 58% of the population is under 17 years of age, more and more Saudis will be chasing fewer and fewer jobs. At the present growth rate, the population is expected to increase by 113 every eight years.26 Such growth will place tremendous strain on families and the Monarchy to maintain material support to the people.
However, with relatively flat oil revenues projected over the next decade, the Monarchy will find it increasingly difficult to maintain current levels of economic and social programs.27 The result could be growing numbers of idle and frustrated youth. They will probably direct their dissatisfaction at the Monarchy through an alliance with radical Islamist groups.
On a positive note, the Saudi economy, which experienced a major crisis following the 
POLITICAL
The political challenge to the Monarchy is more subtle but no less threatening than the consequences of a declining economy. Through the years, the Monarchy has allowed the populace no real involvement in issues of the state. However, at the same time-especially since the Gulf war there has been a demand by both the modernists and religious cons&atives for increased participation in the government. The most significant demand came in 1 99 1, when 500
religious sheiks sent a letter of protest to King Fahad. They criticized corruption in the country and lack of freedom; they demanded political reform. They asked for 12 reforms; including extended implementation of the Sharia and the creation of an independent consultative council (majlis al-shura) which would have responsibility for both domestic and foreign policy. This allowance of very limited participation in government should not be all that surprising. The continued existence of the Monarchy is largely dependent upon its ability to control both domestic and foreign policy, while maintaining its relevancy with both the modernist and religious movements. Yet maintaining relevancy is difficult, since neither group actually needs the Monarchy to achieve its objectives. The Monarchy must therefore demonstrate its relevancy by proving to the different political and social elements that it is the best guarantor of their rights and pri~ileges.~~ This poses a significant challenge to the Monarchy, which must insure that the correct political balance between the conflicting demands of the modernists and the religious conservatives is maintained.
These conflicting demands are potentially serious. The modernists are looking for a more liberal, democratic, and accountable state with many of the values of the West, to include women's rights and universal sufiage. Such reforms run counter to the Wahhabi fimdamentalists, who demand a return to traditional, Islamic values. To survive over the long term the Monarchy must be able to maintain this balancing act of appeasing both parties.
Essentially the Monarchy is challenged to protect the modernists against the threats of rabid fundamentalism, while the religious conservatives look to the Monarchy as a counter to Westernization.
All the while the religious elements are seeking access to more political power. The
Consultative Council was their first gain, followed King Fahad's creation in 1994 of a Supreme
Council of Islamic Affairs. The purpose of this council was to review educational, economic, and foreign policy to ensure that they were being conducted in accordance with Islamic law. Unlike his predecessors, King Fahad is said to impose no limits on family member spending. Some 5,000 princes and an equal number of princesses continue to receive large stipends each month for no work. The Saudis still build large palaces and pocket huge commissions on foreign contracts. These practices are straining the patience of a class that has always been loyal to the status quo.38
This financial extravagance by the Monarchy is unlikely to diminish as long as the king fails to acknowledge the problem. In fact, he failed to act on a recommendation by the Consultative Council that the budget estimates should include all state expenditures including the monthly stipends to the 5,000 Royal prince^.^' Until the Monarchy recognizes the need for financial accountability to the public, this issue will be an ever-increasing source of dissent.
The Monarchy must take action to reduce this negative perception of the Royal Family. This is increasingly important as the Saudi majority's standard of living declines, while the Royal Family lives in total luxury. This negative perception can also create envy and increase political friction within Saudi society. Exacerbating this problem is the incredible growth of the Royal Family, which is doubling every 22-26 years.40 Obviously, the populace will not continue to subsidize current Royal Family excesses and extravagant lifestyles.
The issue of a successor to King Fahad is likewise a politically sensitive issue. Some allege that succession will always be problematic since the country lacks a formal system of succession. Since 1953, an informal system of seniority among the sons of Abdulaziz has been the norm. Today the successor, Crown Prince Abdullah is only slightly younger than the King is.
Competition to determine who will follow the Crown Prince is certain to occur. However, despite this competition and potential rifts within the Royal Family over the succession issue, they fully comprehend the importance of Saud Family unity and stability to maintaining the Monarchy.
OPPOSITION TO THE MONARCHY
The simple fact is the Royal Family has been in complete control of the country since the The most threatening insurrection to the Monarchy was the 1979 takeover of the holy mosque in Mecca. Several hundred people were killed in attempts by the National Guard to retake the mosque over a two-week period. The Monarchy's concern turned to alarm when they discovered that this was a homegrown insurrection, not the work of an outside govern~nent.~~ There is no consensus on the degree to which the Monarchy's survival is threatened.
Restrictions on both the press and travel to the country by independent media make it difficult t assess the magnitude and immediacy of the threat. What is agreed upon is the existence of a real threat to the future of the Royal Family by all who monitor the Kingdom. Today the Monarchy ,
is not in imminent danger of being overthrown. But its demise will be only a matter of time if changes do not occur.
The economy is the most serious problem facing the Monarchy. In the long term, the country must succeed at diversifying its economy. The goal of Saudiazation and reducing reliance on foreign labor must be met if the country is to succeed at employing its growing youthful population. Young Saudis must feel that they have a stake in the country's future through employment in a worthwhile career. Failure to reduce foreign labor will simply add the unemployed to other groups of dissenters. Meanwhile the government must generate revenues by eliminating much of the existing welfare state. This will be a hard but necessary transition for a country that is used to free water, electricity and phone service -to a populace that has never been taxed. The country needs a more capitalistic system with an increased productive sector run by homegrown Saudis.
On the political side, the Monarchy must eventually agree to more non-royal participation in the operation of the government. This will be imperative as they dismantle parts of the welfare state and create new social structures. The Monarchy must allow for more open debate of social and economic issues. The perceived corruption of the Royal Family must be eliminated. This will always be a major threat to the Monarchy and a source of continued and growing opposition.
U.S REACTION TO A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT
The U.S. has few options if the existing regime is overthrown. The U.S. cannot send combat troops to the country to bolster the Royal Family. This would be disastrous, with potential long-term negative effects on our relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.
Taking sides in a civil takeover would preclude establishing relations with the new government if the U.S. supports an ousted Monarchy. Any changes to the government will probably be violent.
The Al-Saud will not go without a fight. Such a takeover could be preceded by increased attacks on the U.S. military and other Westerners.
A change in the government does not necessarily mean a dramatic change in U.S.-Saudi relations, despite the anti-West rhetoric coming fiom the Islamic camp. Any Saudi government will continue to rely on oil exports to maintain the economy and support the growing population.
They will therefore continue to sell oil to the U.S and Europe. They will probably not be in a position to raise prices significantly for fear of losing market shares to the growing number of global suppliers, particularly Norway and Venezuela. 
